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Abstract
The present paper introduces a model of corporate strategies, based on institutional theories of the 
firm and formalized with the concepts of the theory of games. Corporate strategies are balanced 
outcomes of four social games: capital market, corporate governance, product market and social 
responsibility. Two empirical applications of the model are then introduced: a qualitative one, 
consisting in comparative study of strategies deployed by Royal Dutch Shell and Israel Corporation, 
then a quantitative one, presenting a study of capital accumulation and operational efficiency in 79 
companies listed in the Warsaw Stock Exchange. 
Executive summary
Somewhere halfway between classical economics and management science, institutional economics 
seem to be a good ground for predicting the behaviour of corporations, taking into account their role 
as social structures and social players, but without psychologizing and with a clear focus on facts 
and not on forward – looking statements.  Using the theory of games as a means of formalizing and 
putting together different institutional theories of the firm, the  present paper introduces a model in 
which corporate strategies, defined as sets  of real behaviour,  are a balance between four social 
games: capital market, corporate governance, product markets and social responsibility. All the four 
games are, on the long – run, subgames of the Selten's extensive game with imperfect recall, and, on 
the short – run, they are Harsanyi's games with imperfect information, in which players play mixed 
Nash's  strategies  composed  of  pure,  univariate  strategies.  Each  game  is  assumed  to  have  the 
potential to evolute in two opposite directions: towards the Nash's dynamic equilibrium or towards 
a clear lack of such dynamic equilibrium. In the first case, firms integrate the outcomes of all the  
four games into relatively consistent corporate strategies focused on maximisation of the rate of 
return on capital invested, with tendency to balance, more of less fairly, externalities absorbed with 
those emitted in the social responsibility game. Should there not be dynamic equilibrium in any of 
the games, corporate strategies lack consistency and more or less aimed at exploiting uncertainty 
rather than maximising efficiency of the business. In order to evaluate the practical cognitive value 
of  the  model  and  deepening  its  assumptions,  two  empirical  applications  of  the  model  are 
introduced: a) a qualitative one, comparing corporate strategies of Royal Dutch Shell and Israel 
Corporation b)  a  quantitative one,  studying the relationship between operational  efficiency and 
capital accumulation in a sample of 79 companies listed in the Warsaw Stock Exchange, Poland. 
Comparing Royal Dutch Shell and Israel Corporation reveals that the hierarchy of size in the oil & 
gas sector further shapes all the aspects of corporate strategies, capital accumulation and corporate 
governance included. This, in fact, inverts the popular view according to which the structure of the 
sector is the result of individual strategies. The case study allows to define to types of corporate 
strategies: that of the “established giant” and that of “the aggressive challenger”. The first type is 
represented by Royal Dutch Shell and is characterised by: a relatively high uncertainty in the capital 
market game, a corporate governance marked by relatively a financial structure durably balanced 
between debt and equity,  dominant position of management and the main lines of internal conflicts 
entangled around the redistribution of a substantially positive cash flow, a tendency to divest and 
discontinue business, with a clear focus on the core one, rather that acquiring new ones, a relatively 
high efficiency at the operational level and a demonstrable leadership in the technological race in 
core businesses.  The second one,  exemplified by Israel  Corporation,  features a  relatively lower 
uncertainty as for capital markets, combined with both a strong position of block – holders and a  
strong  financial  leverage,  key  internal  conflicts  focusing  on  ways  to  acquire  cash,  notoriously 
lacking to cover all the plans of extensive growth, the latter being linked to a clearly pronounced 
corporate diversification,  a  relatively low operational efficiency and a  position of technological 
follower. The quantitative study of companies listed in the Warsaw Stock Exchange, conducted via 
testing the dynamic correlation between their Tobin's q and their operational profit ratio, lead to 
conclude that an emerging capital market, like the Polish one, creates strong incentives for publicly 
listed  companies  to  play  on  uncertainty  rather  than  maximising  efficiency of  their  businesses. 
However,  those  incentives  taken  into  account,  there  seems  to  be  a  natural  tendency  of  some 
companies to bet rather on long – term search of dynamic equilibrium rather than on short - term 
exploitation of uncertainty.
1. Introduction
Corporations are some of the biggest private organisations in the known history of the mankind. 
They display a highly developed ability to survive and maintain their  institutional continuity in 
complex, quickly changing environment and their future behaviour is an important issue for many 
economic  decisions  are  related  to  predicting  the  future  possible  behaviour  of  corporations. 
Consumers, employees, social activists, governments, as well as other corporations, have to make 
such predictions. In 1950 the net profits of the corporate sector corresponded to 0,2% of the US 
Gross Domestic Product, whilst the outlays of the US federal budget made 15,6%. In 1970 the same 
percentages changed to 0,3% for net corporate profits and 19,3% for federal budget outlays, then in 
2007 the corporate sector in US generated an aggregate net profit of 14,9% of the GDP and the 
federal budget spent 19,6%. When the federal state remained at more or less the same position in 
relation to the whole US economy, the corporate sector greatly increased its relative importance. In 
United Kingdom, the total market value of shares listed in the London Stock Exchange was of some 
8% of the GDP in 1950 and reached over 140% of the GDP in 2004 ( Michie 2000). In 2008, the 
joint net losses of the two biggest American automotive companies, GM and Ford, were enough to 
cover five times the budgetary deficit of Poland. Besides the obvious need for corporate managers 
to predict  the future decisions and reactions of other corporations - competitors, corporate clients 
and suppliers – corporations become increasingly important social partners for governments, social 
activists and employees, and predicting their behaviour is vital for many social decisions. Between 
the classical paradigm of optimisation on one hand, and the radical critics of corporations, like J.K. 
Galbraith or Naomi Klein, on the other hand there is quite a pragmatical need to predict the future 
behaviour of corporations. For example, what is the British Petroleum's behaviour likely to be in the 
next two years, after the catastrophe of its drilling platform in the Mexico Bay ? What actions are 
likely to undertake other oil & gas companies ? Will they reduce underwater drilling to the profit of 
exploiting  oil  sands  in  Northern  Canada  or,  on  the  contrary,  will  they invest  more  in  drilling 
platforms to make them technologically more predictable ?  Even if Naomi Klein is right, calling 
corporations a “de facto global government” and calling to “forces opposing corporate rule” ( Klein 
2009),  what  is  the  practical  predictability of  this  alleged “global  government” and what  social 
actions are really sound as opposition to the “corporate rule” ? The goal of the present paper is 
twofold. From the theoretical point of view this is an attempt to find a viable compromise, as for 
assessing and studying corporate strategies, between two perspectives : the one of economics on 
one hand and that of management science on the other hand, with an underlying assumption that the 
so – called 'institutional school' is an appropriate background for seeking such a correspondence. 
From a more practical point of view the article aims at showing how to study information disclosed 
by corporations in the prospect to assess their future actions.
2. The theoretical background
First, let's point out an important fact concerning the very definition of strategy. In management 
science the concept uses to be approached from a militaristic point of view, as a plan or a bundle of 
plans ( Hoskisson et al. 1999; Ansoff 1965; Learned et al. 1965; Porter 1980, 1981, 1985, 1991; 
Pralahad,  Hamel  1990),  with,  however,  a  visible  dissonance  between  plans  and  their  real 
implementation  (  Quinn  1980;  Mintzberg,Waters  1985;  Kaplan,  Norton  1992,  1996,  2000; 
Schendel, Hofer 1979; Horovitz 1979; Vancil 1973; Lorange, Scott Morton 1974; Newman 1975; 
Camillus, Grant 1980; Simmonds 1981; Band, Scanlan, 1995; Oldman, Tomkins 1999).   There is 
another way of understanding the word strategy, more in the lines of natural sciences, like 'survival 
strategy' or 'hunting strategy'. In this second approach strategy is behaviour rather than plans. As 
prediction of corporate actions comes, it seems more important and more pragmatic to predict what 
the given corporation is likely to do than what it is likely to plan to do. The term of behaviour,  
applied to corporations, is a simplifying anthropomorphism too, however the concept is scalable. 
Individuals  behave  and  collectivities  behave  too,  but  whilst  individuals  think  and  behave, 
collectivities behave only, without thinking. Thus, the so – called 'behaviour' of organisations can be 
observed,  at  the  difference  of  individuals'  behaviour,  without  direct  reference  to  any  mental 
processes  at  the steering wheel,  with grouping observations in  modalities of a  scale.  As far as 
behaviour  is  concerned,  observability  of  corporations  comes  as  a  key  issue.  There  is  a  sharp 
difference between observing a corporation from inside and observing it from outside. The former, 
more frequently used in management science, focuses on peculiarities of every given firm and on 
processes going on inside this firm. The latter, more typical to economic sciences, seeks common 
denominators among firms and tends to put forth, with variable emphasis, financial information 
disclosed by and about corporations. The confrontation of these two perspectives of observation 
raises questions about accuracy and predictive power of financial statements ( Shank, Govindarajan 
1989; Wilson 1995; Khandawalla 1972; Gordon, Miller 1976; Otley 1994; Fisher 1995; Brancato 
1995; Neely 1999) as well as that of non – financial disclosures, presentations of strategies included 
( Ferraro, Pfeffer, Sutton 2005; Ghoshal 2005). Classical and neoclassical economics assume that a 
firm maximises profits,  cash - flows and shareholders' value, through operational excellence in 
product markets, in presence of relatively neutral financial markets ( see for example: Friedman 
1970; Modigliani, Miller 1958; Tobin 1961, 1969; Tobin, Brainard 1968, 1977; Backus, Brainard, 
Smith,  Tobin  1980;  Brainard,  Shapiro,  Shoven  1990).  These  assumptions  encounter  puzzling 
empirical  evidence.  Puzzling,  because  neither   exactly  confirming  nor  definitely  rejecting  the 
optimisation hypothesis. Mergers and acquisitions are among the most noticeable examples. On one 
hand,  they  are  presented  by  corporate  managers  as  rational  decisions  aimed  at  maximising 
shareholders' value. On the other hand, they use to take place in massive, cyclical  waves, with very 
problematic efficiency, subsequent waves of divestitures and financial markets not neutral at all 
(  Golbe,  White  1993; Sudarsanam 2003; Salter,  Weinhold 1979;  Jensen 1986, 1993/1999;  Gort 
1962; Rumelt 1974; Meeks 1977; Steiner 1975; Seth 1990a; Seth 1990b; Singh, Montgomery 1987; 
Lubatkin 1987; Murphy 1985; Stewart,  Glassman 1988). Corporate strategies seem to be much 
more  about  risk  management,  experimenting  and coordination,  with  the  trial  and error  method 
strongly present in the background, than about optimisation ( Knight 1921; Kaldor 1935; Alchian, 
Demsetz  1972).  We  are  in  the  world  of  transaction  costs,  imperfect  contracts,   opportunistic 
behaviour and capital services supplied in discrete bundles, not by units ( Coase 1937; Penrose 
1959; Chandler 1962, 1977; Williamson 1975, 1985; Jensen  1993/1999 ). 
Now, what's so special about corporate strategies, compared to strategies of smaller businesses ? In 
fact, three issues make crucial difference: size, continuity and interaction with financial markets. A 
corporation is not just a participant of broader social structures, this is a structure by itself, with its 
own vertical and horizontal dynamics, a well developed division of labour and conflicts of interests 
( Selznik 1957 ). Size gives it  a unique influence upon its social responsibility,  which includes 
market  power,  transmission  of  externalities  and  systemic  risk  to  the  aforementioned  social 
responsibility ( Means 1967), as well as the ability to create internal labour markets, more attractive 
financially than self - employment ( Hamilton 2000; Poutvaara, Tuomala 2004; OECD 1992). Small 
private  businesses  seldom  evolute  to  the  institutional  form  of  corporations.  In  that  respect, 
corporations are not just a bigger copy of small firms, they are a completely different institutional 
type  of  economic  agent  (  Uhlaner,  Thurik  2003;  Gyntelberg,  Kyhl  1999;  Kor,  Mahoney 2000; 
Garnsey  et  al.  2003;  Khan  2003).  The  difference  covers  institutional  continuity,  too.  At  the 
difference of private businesses, which do not develop economically important inter – generational 
transmission of knowledge, experience and capital, corporations display a highly developed ability 
of such transmission ( Selznik 1957; Nelson, Phelps 1966; Clark et al. 1994).  Size and institutional 
continuity of corporations are grounded in their peculiar contractual structure and the corresponding 
link with financial markets. Limited liability of every shareholder, freely tradable  shares,  legal  
personality and ability to act on behalf of its shareholders ( debt contracting included) , separation 
of ownership and management, power and internal influence proportional to the capital invested and 
to information - all this makes that corporations offer unique possibilities of investment, and, in the 
same time, have immense possibilities of growth ( Knight 1921; Stout 2004; Blair 2003; Hansmann 
et al. 2006; Alchian, Demsetz 1972; Jensen, Meckling 1976; Fama, Jensen 1983).       
Whilst strongly linked to massive investment in new technologies ( Weidenbaum, Jensen 1991; Roy 
1997), corporations display a peculiar tendency to accumulate capital, increase profits and invest in 
R&D even when return on innovation is null or negative. In fact, the bulk of the global innovative 
effort  takes  place  in  5  countries:  USA,  Japan  and  China  as  leaders,  with  France  and  United 
Kingdom as immediate followers, which all display, on the long run, a negative marginal value 
added on innovation. However, financial markets offer the possibility to compensate, by successful 
financial placements, the downturns of innovative projects. This possibility can be easily overused, 
which  leads  to  frequently  observed  underinvestment  of  plant,  property  and  equipment  in 
corporations (Scitovsky 1954; Murphy et al. 1989; Redding 1996; Acemoglu 1996; Masters 1998). 
This, in turn, allows financial markets to reach such a Nash's dynamic equilibrium, in which it is 
dominated by corporations whose accumulation of capital is independent from their  operational 
efficiency  ( Waśniewski 2008, 2009, 2010).   
3. The model
On the long run, the basic question about future behaviour of any corporation is: will they focus on 
investing  in  the  development  of  new  technologies  or  will  they  try  to  minimize  risk  through 
extensive investment in non – specific financial assets. It is argued in the present paper that any 
action undertaken by any corporation will firstly aim its survival in terms of institutional continuity, 
then the moderation of its internal, natural conflicts of interests and only then, in the third place, any 
kind of economic optimisation comes as a motive.  The theory of games, with behaviour as the 
unknown variable and the set of motives as a known constant, offers the possibility to translate 
general and quasi – tautological concepts  like 'survival', 'conflicts' or 'optimisation' into practical 
tools of prediction. Basing on the three economic Nobel prized ( 1994) game theories – those of 
John Nash ( Nash 1950a, 1950b, 1951, 1953), John Harsanyi ( Harsanyi 1953; 1966; 1967; 1968 ) 
and Reinhard Selten ( Selten 1975 ) – it is possible to build and validate a model of corporate 
strategies. These are the outcome of four games: CM, CG, PM and SE, played respectively at four 
different plans: capital markets, corporate governance, product markets and social responsibility. In 
each of the four games a finite set of players plays Harsanyi's games with imperfect information,  
which are, in turn, subgames of a Selten's extensive game with imperfect recall. Each player i at the 
given moment  t uses a set of pure Nash's strategies, which together for a mixed Nash's strategy, 
associated with a pay – off function ( Equation 1 ). 
Equation 1 – General formula of strategy in a game
S(i;t) = [MA(i;t); R(i;t)]
– where  S(i;t) is the mixed strategy of the player  i at  the moment  t,  MA(i;t)  is the set  of 
modalities of action of the player i at the moment t, R(i;t) is the set of results achieved by 
the player i at the moment t.
The set of results  R(i;t) is causally and functionally derived from the set of modalities of action 
MA(i;t).  Both causality and function are expressed by a general ratio  R(i;t)/MA(i;t),  which varies 
from player to player, as their individual strategies display different efficiency. R(i;t)/MA(i;t) varies 
in time, too, as players modify and test their modalities of action, evaluating them on the grounds of 
their own results and other players' results. Any given set of strategies  S ( for the same player at 
different moments or at the same moment for different players ) is characterised by a variance V(S) 
of R(i;t)/MA(i;t), which, in turn, is the inversely proportional estimator of the overall consistency of 
the given set of strategies. At any given moment t in the given set of players there is a reference 
value V*(S;t) of V(S;t), which is the critical level and beyond which strategies become inconsistent. 
There is dynamic equilibrium in the given game when V(S;t) remains below V*(S;t) ( Equation 2).  
Equation 2 – Condition of dynamic equilibrium
 V(S;t) < V*(S;t) or V(S;t)/V*(S;t) < 1
In dynamic equilibrium every individual strategy S(i;t) is in interaction with the space of the game 
in the sense that individual strategies of different players mutually shape one another. This, in turn, 
leads to a certain degree of isomorphism among individual strategies.  Modalities of action MA(i;t) 
are imperfectly heterogeneous among players. Mutual observation and imitation make some typical 
modalities M*(x;t) of action arise, where x is a variable describing the type of modality. A common 
reference level R*(t) may be defined at the moment t for the aggregate results R(i;t) of every given 
player  i.  All  strategies  S(i;t) that  bear  results  R(i;t) lower  than  the  reference  level  R*(t) are 
unsatisfactory  for  players.  On  the  other  hand  strategies  S(i;t) with  results  R(i;t)  >  R*(t) are 
satisfactory. The dynamic equilibrium at the moment t corresponds to a given structure of the set of 
players. This set is fundamentally divided into two subsets: 
a)      subset {R(i;t) > R*(t)} of those players, whose strategies bring satisfactory results;
b)      subset {R(i;t) < R*(t)} of players with unsatisfactory results;
Players that belong to {R(i;t) > R*(t)} are motivated to carry on the current game in the sense of 
Harsanyi’s theory and they do so, tending to keep their modalities of actions unchanged. Those 
belonging to {R(i;t) < R*(t)}  have interest to change the rules of the game and to pass to another 
game,  and they correspondingly modify their  modalities  of  action.  In  the  absence  of  dynamic 
equilibrium no typical modalities of action M*(x;t) as well as no common reference level R*(t) for 
results can arise as uncertainty is too high. Players define their relative satisfaction on the grounds 
of risk moderation, not results R(i;t) as such. They seek to reduce uncertainty first and only then to 
optimize their results. As for modalities of action, high uncertainty makes them change so quickly 
that types have no time to form. Such a situation is self – propelling mechanism until some players 
reach the state described in Equation 2, which can become the core of new dynamic equilibrium.
Corporate strategies in the given set of firms are described as the ( current, historical or future) state 
of four games:  CM ( capital markets), CG ( corporate governance), PM ( product markets) and SR 
( social responsibility). The state of each game is given by four variables: V(S;t), V*(S;t), M*(x;t),  
R*(t)  and by two ratios:  V(S;t)/V*(S;t) and  M*(x;t)/R*(t). The ratio  V(S;t)/V*(S;t) is the relative 
consistence of strategies played and  M*(x;t)/R*(t) is the relative efficiency of typical modalities of 
action. Dynamic  equilibrium  does  not  require,  to  exist,  any  minimum  level  of  efficiency 
R(i;t)/MA(i;t) and can arise on the grounds of both highly efficient and clearly inefficient strategies,  
with many possible intermediate states in between. 
As four games go on simultaneously, real corporate strategies are balanced outcomes of the same 
four  games.  The  essential  attribute  of  every  corporation  is  to  keep  working  the  institutional 
cogwheels joining the capital markets, the corporate governance, product markets and the broad 
social responsibility. Those cogwheels can work in two broadly defined configurations: in presence 
of  dynamic equilibria  in  all  four games or  in  absence of  such equilibria.  In the present  model 
dynamic equilibrium is essentially a reasonable level of predictability: any strategy is subjectively 
rational when players can predict with satisfactory accuracy the outcomes of their actions. Only 
then mixed strategies, composed of pure strategies, can emerge, with dynamic equilibrium as a 
consequence. In markets bearing a reasonable level of predictability corporate strategies balance the 
four games and optimize results of each. As predictability disappears, corporate strategies are only 
balancing, without optimization. This is a little more formalized approach of the Frank Knight's 
opinion ( Knight 1921), that corporation are unique in their ability to manage risk and to make a 
link between the financial markets and those of goods and services. After all that's how the first 
corporations,  like  the  East  India  Company or  the  early Bank  of  England,  worked.  They were 
bundles  of  relatively  autonomous  enterprises  and  the  company  as  legal  entity  was  more  a 
middleman between the investors and the active merchants that a typical hierarchy. Risks were so 
high and diverse that optimization was not at all the chief goal of the company, which was much 
more oriented on maintaining its own institutional continuity ( Harris 2005; Hansmann et al. 2006 ). 
The big question is how, in practice, dynamic equilibrium can appear and disappear in a social  
game. According to the Nash's theory, dynamic equilibrium is the normal state of a game played 
along consistent rules. Logically, dynamic equilibrium disappears or does not have the chance to 
appear when rules of the game are inconsistent, i.e. when causality between action and results is 
troubled and uncertain. In real social games such troubled causality appears mainly when some 
players has privileged positions compared to others, and, consequently, when they play according to 
special  rules.  This  is  the proverbial  ace up one's  sleeve.  Privileges  consist  in  various  kinds  of 
specific social influence, or power, shortly. Information is one of the most important factors of that, 
insider trading in capital markets coming as a very illustrative example. Thus, dynamic equilibrium 
is there when all players have more or less the same influence upon the space of the game. Should 
any significant privileges appear, dynamic equilibrium cannot be. 
Besides the concept of dynamic equilibrium, the model has another cornerstone, as far as empirical 
development is concerned: the reference values. They concern  results (R*) and uncertainty  (V*). 
Whatever kind of social game is taking place, players tend to establish benchmarks for assessing 
both results and uncertainty. More organized is the game, more institutionalized and intersubjective 
are  these benchmarks.  In  capital  markets  there are  market  indexes  (  sometimes combined with 
references to the real estate market), in product markets there are operational and financial ratios. 
Thus these  two games – capital  market  and product  market  -  display pretty obvious  empirical 
reference values. For the other two: corporate governance and social responsibility, reference values 
are more vague. 
The benefits covered by the expectations of the participants in the corporate governance game are 
various in kind. There is no even one definition of shareholders' value, as for many shareholders the 
real benefit is power and control, whilst for other this is plain cash that counts above anything else. 
These two can vary independently and it is practically impossible to set one common variable to 
measure them, and this is only a sample of the true complexity. Thus it is assumed that every stream 
of cash flowing to the firm or out of it results  from a contract being consumed. Following the  
Williamson's theory of imperfect contracts ( Williamson 1975, 1985), those contracts are assumed 
to give occasion to imperfect redistribution of economic rent. Consequently, the gross total of cash 
flows incoming to the corporation and going outside raise a total sum of economic rent, imperfectly 
redistributed. The total population of stakeholders in a corporation is composed both of capital and 
labour providers, however capital providing plays the chief role. Thus the rate of return on capital 
invested  is  the  reference  value  R*(t) for  results  R(i;t) obtained  by  individual  players  and  the 
volatility of the same rate of return in the reference value V* for assessing uncertainty.     
A similarly complicated picture emerges as different kinds of benefits are considered in the social 
responsibility game. For such local government a satisfactory interaction with a corporation's  local 
plant would sum up to a given amount of taxes paid, whilst some others would look for stabilization 
of the local labour market or proper preservation of local tourist sites. That's why the theory of 
games  is  so  useful  to  model  such  situations.  It  avoids  psychologizing  when  it  becomes  too 
complicated to be empirically operational, and, in the same time, allows to formulate assumptions 
referring to subjective expectations. Even if this is not possible to measure exactly the reference 
values, given the complexity of expected states of nature, the most important assumption is that 
those reference value are actively researched and assessed by players, in more or less rational ways.
In the capital market game CM the great majority of players are both on the supply and the demand 
side, as in real capital markets most participants are investors and capital takers as well. This is  
pretty obvious for corporations, but this is true for small individual market players as well who can 
contract bank loans to invest in the stock market. Each player (i) in the capital market game plays a 
real mixed strategy S(i;t) with modalities of action MA(i;t) composed of a set of investments made 
Iv(i;t) and liabilities contracted Lb(i;t), the set of results ( expected pay – offs ) consisting of a rate 
of return on capital invested in presence of the given level of risk. It is assumed, following the 
Tobin's  q  theory  (  Tobin  1961,  1969;  Tobin,  Brainard  1968,  1977)  that  there  is  a  theoretical, 
empirically unobservable, though expected by market participants, free – of - risk rate of return on 
capital invested ( IR*). The real rate of return IR is compared with IR* by market participants and 
according to the current level of market volatility they expect a given real rate of return IR. In 
presence of dynamic equilibrium in the capital market game the ratio of IR/IR* is equal to the 
Tobin's q coefficient, computed with the formula:  q = [(n*p + a – eq)/a] ( Tobin, Brainard 1968, 
1977) where n is the number of outstanding shares listed, p is the average price of shares, a is the 
book  value  of  assets  and  eq is  the  value  of  equity.  In  other  words,  in  presence  of  dynamic 
equilibrium in the capital market the overall market value of assets, in which the given investor had 
invested, including the debt possible to raise with the backing of these assets, all this measured with 
the Tobin's q coefficient is enough for investors to compensate their subjectively observable risk ( 
Theorem 1).   Without  dynamic equilibrium the subjectively observable risk is  so high that  the 
overall market value of assets possessed is not enough to compensate it. Therefore the expected rate 
of return IR, given the risk incurred,  is so high that no realistically possible capital gains from 
investments in productive assets can satisfy it. Consequently, players focus on risk management 
through hedging and diversification of investments, instead of maximizing the overall rate of return 
IR. The ratio of efficiency  M*(x;t)/R*(t)  is impossible to compute then. Players divide into two 
groups: those minimizing volatility and those trying to maximize it ( Theorem 2 ). 
Theorem 1 – The capital market game CM with Nash's dynamic equilibrium
[V(S;t;CM) < V*(S;t;CM)] => [IR(S;t;CM)/IR*(S;t;CM)] = [(n*p + a – eq)/a]
[V(S;t;CM) < V*(S;t;CM)] => S(i;t;CM) = {[Iv1(i;t), Iv2(i;t),..., Ivn(i;t); Lb1(i;t), Lb2(i;t),..., 
Lbm(i;t)];maxIR/IR*} 
Theorem 2 – The capital market game CM without Nash's dynamic equilibrium
[V(S;t;CM) > V*(S;t;CM)] => [IR(S;t;CM)/IR*(S;t;CM)] > [(n*p + a – eq)/a]
[V(S;t;CM) > V*(S;t;CM)] => S(i;t;CM) = {[Iv1(i;t), Iv2(i;t),..., Ivn(i;t); Lb1(i;t), Lb2(i;t),..., 
Lbm(i;t); maxV(S;t;CM)} 
or
 [V(S;t;CM) > V*(S;t;CM)] => S(i;t;CM) = {[Iv1(i;t), Iv2(i;t),..., Ivn(i;t); Lb1(i;t), Lb2(i;t),..., 
Lbm(i;t); minV(S;t;CM)} 
Note: the ' =>' used in the formal notation of both theorems is the symbol of implication used in  
formal logic and is to be interpreted as 'if A, then B'.
In the corporate governance game CG each player (i) plays a strategy  S(i;t) with modalities of 
action MA(i;t) composed of a real voting power position Pv(i;t) ( which may also be indirect, in the 
case of debtholders) and information gathered  If(i;t), in the prospect of maximizing results  R(i;t) 
consisting of cash flows received  Cf(i;t) and indirect benefits  Bn(i;t) ( influence upon important 
contracts  of  the  corporation  with  third  parties  or  the  governance  of  affiliates,  for  example  ). 
Extending the Tobin's q theory it is assumed that in presence of dynamic equilibrium both Cf(i;t) 
and Bn(i;t) have theoretical, though unobservable risk – free reference values, Cf*(i;t) and Bn*(i;t),  
respectively. Players aim at maximizing the ratios of  Cf(i;t)/Cf*(i;t)  and  Bn(i;t)/Bn*(i;t).  Thus, in 
presence of dynamic equilibrium  Cf*(i;t) and  Bn*(i;t)  sum up to a certain rate of return IR on 
capital invested in presence of a given level of risk. Further on results are maximised in the same 
way  than  in  the  capital  game  which  makes  the  Tobin's  q  coefficient  the  empirical  result  to 
maximise.  ( Theorem 3). Should dynamic equilibrium not occur in corporate governance, no risk – 
free  reference  values  exist  and  players  split  into  two  categories:  those  willing  to  minimize 
uncertainty on one hand and those striving to maximize it, in the prospect of gaining additional 
benefits as risk premiums ( Theorem 4). 
Theorem 3 – The corporate governance game CG with Nash's dynamic equilibrium
[V(S;t;CG) < V*(S;t;CG)] => S(i;t;CG) = {Pv(i;t), If(i;t); max[Cf(i;t)/C*(i;t)]; 
max[Bn(i;t)/Bn*(i;t)]
and
[V(S;t;CG) < V*(S;t;CG)] => {max[Cf(i;t)/C*(i;t)]; max[Bn(i;t)/Bn*(i;t)]} =  
[IR(S;t;CM)/IR*(S;t;CM)] = [(n*p + a – eq)/a]
Theorem 4 – The corporate governance game without Nash's dynamic equilibrium
[V(S;t;CG) > V*(S;t;CG)] => S(i;t;CG) = {Pv(i;t), If(i;t); [Cf(i;t)/C*(i;t)]; maxV(S;t;CG)]
or
 [V(S;t;CG) > V*(S;t;CG)] => S(i;t;CG) = {Pv(i;t), If(i;t); [Cf(i;t)/C*(i;t)]; minV(S;t;CG)] 
It  is to notice that depending on the presence or absence of dynamic equilibrium the corporate 
governance dame CG displays different kinds of link with the capital markets game CM. Should 
both of them reach dynamic equilibrium, they also both favour strategies aimed at maximising the 
same rate of return on capital invested. Consequently, the corporate governance game CG is simply 
a  prolongation  (  or  a  particular  case  )  of  the  capital  markets  game  CM.   Voting  power  and 
information in hand serve the players to achieve results expected from rational investments or loans. 
If any of the two games does not reach dynamic equilibrium, this link is broken and the capital 
market game CM is played independently from the corporate governance game CG. The game or 
games played without dynamic equilibrium favour strategies oriented at exploiting short – term 
advantage resulting from imperfect information. 
The product markets game PM covers all  operational, financial and investment activities of the 
corporation, supposed to be previously agreed as a temporary outcome of the corporate governance 
game CG. Thus, the product market game include all  organizational aspects of the corporation. 
Such an approach is based on the assumption that, though frequently suboptimal, the organizational 
structure of the corporation is rational in the sense that it is shaped in the prospect of maximizing 
efficiency. In the product markets game players are corporations themselves, at the difference of the 
capital markets game CM ( players are investors) and the corporate governance game CG ( players 
are stakeholders of the corporation ).  Corporations aim at maximizing a complex set  of results 
R(i;t;), composed of:  the scale of activity AS(i;t), profitability PR(i;t), short – term accumulation of 
capital  SCA(i;t) and the long – term ability to accumulate capital  LCA(i;t).  In order to maximize 
these results corporations use twofold modalities of action MA(i;t): a) projects related to investment 
in and exploitation specific technologies  tech(i;t) and b) investments in non – specific financial 
assets  fa(i;t),  as a compensation of risks incurred in tech(i;t;)  projects.  Modalities of action are 
twofold in kind but multiple in practical application: a firm can lead many investment projects in 
the same time in each of the two categories. In presence of dynamic equilibrium the components of 
the set of results are causally linked: scale of activity AS(i;t) and profitability PR(i;t) generate short 
– term accumulation of capital SCA(i;t), which is the same as the long – term ability to accumulate 
capital  LCA(i;t).  The  latter  finds  its  outcome  in  the  ability  of  the  corporation  to  bring  to  its 
shareholders the rate of return expected on the grounds of the risk observed, estimated in the same 
way that in the capital markets game, with Tobin's q. This causality assumed, the set of modalities 
of action is composed essentially of the tech(i;t) projects, the fa(i;t) investments playing a marginal 
role, as maximizing investment in adequate  tech(i;t) projects allows the maximization of results 
R(i;t) (Theorem 5).  Without dynamic equilibrium in the product markets the risk related to tech(i;t) 
projects is so high that they remain under-invested, an over – important part of capital being placed 
in  fa(i;t) investments,  no  obvious  causality  linking the  components  of  the  set  of  results  R(i;t) 
(Theorem 6). 
Theorem 5 – The product markets game PM with Nash's dynamic equilibrium
[V(S;t;PM) < V*(S;t;PM)] => S(i;t;PM)={max[tech1(i;t),tech2(i;t),..., techo(i;t)];
[fa1(i;t),fa2(i;t),...,fap(i;t;)]; 
max[AS(i;t);PR(i;t); SCA(i;t); LCA(i;t)]}
and
[V(S;t;PM) < V*(S;t;PM)] => [maxAS(i;t) => maxPR(i;t) => maxSCA(i;t) => 
[maxLCA(i;t)]
 and
[V(S;t;PM) < V*(S;t;PM)] => {[maxLCA(i;t)] = max[(n*p + a – eq)/a]}
Theorem 6 – The product markets game PM without Nash's dynamic equilibrium
[V(S;t;PM) > V*(S;t;PM)] => S(i;t;PM)= {[tech1(i;t),tech2(i;t),..., techo(i;t)];
max[fa1(i;t),fa2(i;t),...,fap(i;t;)];
max[AS(i;t);PR(i;t); SCA(i;t); LCA(i;t)]}
The social responsibility game covers all of those interactions of the corporation with the outside 
world which are externalities. Players in this game are corporations as well as its social partners: 
governments, non – profit organisations etc. Each player uses various modalities of action MA(i;t),  
which aim either at the transfer of externalities outside  ExO(i;t) or at absorption of externalities 
from outside ExIn(i;t). In presence of dynamic equilibrium players aim at homoeostasis, balancing 
ExO(i;t) and  ExIn(i;t)  (  Theorem 7  ),  whereas  in  absence  of  dynamic  equilibrium they aim at 
maximizing ExO(i;t) at the expense of ExIn(i;t) ( Theorem 8).
Theorem 7 – The social responsibility game SR with Nash's dynamic equilibrium
[V(S;t;SE) < V*(S;t;SE)] => S(i;t;SE)={ MA(i;t);[ExO(i;t) = ExIn(i;t)]}
Theorem 8 - The social responsibility game SR without Nash's dynamic equilibrium
[V(S;t;SE) > V*(S;t;SE)] => S(i;t;SE)= {MA(i;t);max[ExO(i;t)/ExIn(i;t)]
Here below two kinds of empirical application of the model are introduced, the qualitative one and 
the quantitative one.  Both serve as examples of the possibilities offered by the model and also 
provide additional insights into the central research problem, which is the predictability of corporate 
strategies. 
4. Qualitative empirical study – Royal Dutch Shell vs. Israel 
Corporation
One of the typical prediction problems relating to corporate strategies consists in assessing whether 
there is a lasting, qualitative disparity between strategies adopted by firms of different sizes in the 
same  industry.  The  issue  has  already  been  addressed,  especially  by  the  theory  of  industrial 
organisation ( see for example: Porter 1980, 1981, 1985, 1991), though these developments remain 
restricted to the purely operational level of activity, i.e. production and marketing. From this point 
of view there is nor material difference between corporate strategies and those of private firms. The 
model of corporate strategies introduced in the present paper broadens the scope of research and 
orients it on peculiarities of corporations as market players, through hypothesizing about financial 
and investment activities, corporate governance and systemic risk also taken into account.  
Royal Dutch Shell is the biggest firm in the oil & gas sector and the biggest corporation in the 
world, from the point of view of net revenues. It is also one of the oldest, with its institutional roots 
in the Samuel brothers' invention of tanker ships and the Dutch oil exploitations in Sumatra, at the 
end of the nineteenth century. Israel Corporation is at the 47 th place in the global oil & gas sector, 
regarding net revenues, and it's a relatively young firm, created by the Israeli government in 1968 
and then, during the following 14 years, progressively privatized. 
Regarding both the scale of activity and the capital accumulated Royal Dutch Shell belongs to the 
subset of {R(i;t) > R*(t)} of successful players,  whilst Israel Corporation belongs to the subset 
{R(i;t) < R*(t)} of players with unsatisfactory results. Thus, Royal Dutch Shell plays a leader's 
strategy, Israel Corporation playing a challenger's one. Is is argued, on the grounds of the model,  
that this strategic disparity does not only appear at the operational level, but also at the business and 
corporate one, and, operational disparities are visible through different investment behaviour. 
For the purpose of comparing these two firms, a hypothesis is stated, according to which there are 
significant disparities between Royal Dutch Shell's and Israel Corporation's corporate strategies, in 
terms of the model introduced in the previous chapter.  Consistently with the theoretical foundations 
of the model, validating this thesis covers observations of real behaviour of both companies, during 
a moderately long period of time, from 2005 until 2008, letting aside as much as possible their  
officially declared plans. The aforementioned real behaviour covers all four games of the model and 
had been studied on the grounds of publicly available official corporate documents published by the 
two companies.   
Beginning with the capital market game, a noticeable difference appears. Royal Dutch Shell's shares 
are  listed  in  three  stock  markets:  New York,  London  and  Amsterdam,  all  big,  diversified  and 
relatively stable. Israel Corporation is listed only in one stock market, the Tel Aviv one, small in 
terms of capitalization and subject to strong fluctuations, both cyclical and non - cyclical. The level 
of uncertainty in the Royal Dutch Shell's capital market game seems to be fairly lower than it is for 
Israel  Corporation.  However,  the  information  supplied  by  the  computation  of  the  Tobin's  q 
coefficient  contradicts  this  assumption.  At  the end of  2005,  the Tobin's  q coefficient  for  Israel 
Corporation took the value of q = 1,95, to fall to q = 1,84 at the end of 2008. For Royal Dutch Shell 
the two values are respectively of q(2005) = 2,47 and q(2008) = 1,68. Israel Corporation seems to 
be less exposed to sudden fluctuations of the rate of return on capital, than his bigger competitor. 
Israel Corporation accumulates capital much faster than Royal Dutch Shell.  Between the end of 
2005 and the end of 2008 the book value of assets of Israel Corporation rose by 149%, from USD 
mln 5 914,4 to USD mln 14 706. The resulting accumulation of USD mln 8 791,6 was invested 
mainly (  some 60%) in specific assets:  plant,  property,  equipment and intangibles. In the same 
period the Royal Dutch Shell's book value changed from USD mln 219 516 to 282 401, thus by 
some 29% or  USD mln  62  885.  Some 40% of  this  accumulation  had  been  invested  in  plant, 
property and equipment, 25% was due to an increase in operational receivables and 18% was linked 
to acquisitions of businesses.  On the passive side of the balance sheet, capital accumulation in 
Israel Corporation has been a little more supported by a growth of equity ( +196%) than by the 
growth of debt ( +136%), thus changing the financial leverage of the company from 79,09% to 
75,13%.  The almost  twofold growth of value of equity resulted mainly from accumulation of 
profits whilst the number of outstanding shares has hardly grown, by 1%. For Royal Dutch Shell 
the capital structure had barely changed between 2005 and 2008, the financial leverage passing 
from 55,39% to 54,36%, the number of outstanding shares falling significantly, however, by almost 
8%, due to buyback operations.
The corporate governance of Israel Corporation seems to be marked, in the first place, by conflicts 
related to insufficient cash resources,  measured against the ambitious investment plans1.  On the 
other hand, the corporate governance game at Royal Dutch Shell  appears to be focused on the 
redistribution of a strongly positive cash flow2. Those qualitatively different internal conflicts are 
moderated  within  equally  different  frameworks  of  power  and  influence.  Some  55%  of  Israel 
Corporation's equity belongs to an Israeli financial group OFER, another 18% to the Bank Leumi 
Le-Israel Ltd. Only some 27% of equity is more or less free – float. Thus, direct voting power is  
strongly concentrated, with, however,  important indirect influence of debt – holders,  due to the 
important financial leverage. The corporate governance pattern is strongly oriented on balancing 
between block – holders and debt – holders. In the case of Royal Dutch Shell, according to its own 
official statements there is no shareholders holding individually more than 5% of votes. That, with a 
1 see for example Financial Times from September the 25th 2009, June the 17th 2008, August the 04th 2009, February 
the 26th 2008
2 see for example Financial Times from: April the 29th 2009, September the 11th 2009, September the 4th 2009
business generating a strong surplus of cash and a noticeably lower indirect power of debt - holders, 
indicates a corporate governance oriented on moderating the conflicts between management and 
small shareholders.  
During the 2005 – 2008 period each firm went through a different path of growth. As for Israel 
Corporation it  was almost exclusively extensive growth through acquisitions and joint ventures, 
summing up to 1661,5 millions of USD, among which the most significant were: a) the 605 million 
automotive joint – venture with the Chinese company Chery Automobiles Ltd. b) the 547 million 
acquisition of Globeleq Ameicas Ltd., a South American company operating in the electric power 
production business c )  the 361,5 million acquisition of Supresta LLC, a Delaware (US) based 
chemical company. Royal Dutch Shell displays the opposite tendency – it has been divesting parts  
of businesses or entire businesses without acquiring new ones.  
The path of intensive development, through technological progress, is noticeably different in those 
two companies.  Both seem to spend a significant percentage of their  revenues on R&D, sector 
specificity taken into account, which means 0,35% on average for Israel Corporation and 0,25% for 
Royal Dutch Shell. As their scale of activity is noticeably different, these average percentages give 
respectively some 45 millions of USD a year for the former and about 900 millions for the latter. 
Israel Corporation does not directly own any patents or innovations filed in for patenting at the 
international scale, whereas Royal Dutch Shell display some patenting activity, though very uneven 
in time ( 50 patent applications in 2005 and only one in 2008). As it comes to embodiment of  
technology, both firms display positive net investment, amortization taken into account. The ratio of 
net investment, when the latter is related to revenues, displays a tendency for growth in both cases, 
however the values and their change are significantly different. In 2005 the net investment ratio of 
Israel  Corporation  was  of  0,29%,  whilst  at  Royal  Dutch  Shell  it  was  1,3%.  In  2008  Israel 
Corporation passed to 2,57% and Royal Dutch Shell to 4,67%. As for the return on capital, the ratio 
of  return  on assets  (  ROA = net  profit/  book value  of  assets  )  in  2005 was of  6,2% at  Israel  
Corporation and 12,0% at Royal Dutch Shell, and in 2008 it reached 8,0% at Israel Corporation and 
fell to 9,4% at Royal Dutch Shell. 
The comparison of Royal Dutch Shell and Israel Corporation, summarized above, shows that being 
different in scale in the same branch of business does not sum up, on the qualitative side, just to 
different marketing strategies. It covers all aspects of the organisation: legal, financial, scientific. 
This is just what states the model introduced in the present paper. Disparities in relative success in  
playing the same game make the players adopt completely different strategies and as it is question 
of corporations, with their unique legal and financial pattern, the differences cover all aspects of this 
pattern. 
The model states that the most important kind of dynamics governing any reasonably selected set of 
social players is the tension between the leaders and the challengers. The leaders tend to conserve 
the  status  quo,  the  challengers  strive  to  change  the  rules  of  the  game.  The  formal  line  of 
demarcation between the conservative leaders and the challenging revolutionaries is the reference 
value of results  R*(t). The present comparative case study indicates that in the oil & gas sector 
R*(t) seems to be a composite  value,  encompassing the scale  of activity,  the rate  of  return on 
capital,  the  free  cash  –  flow  at  hand  and  the  relative  ability  to  legally  appropriate  important 
technologies. The R(i;t) < R*(t) player that is Israel Corporation seems to adopt modalities of action 
MA(i;t) focused on a strong orientation at financial levering of extensive growth of an organisation 
closely  supervised  by  important  block  –  holders,  combined  with  noticeable  diversification  of 
activity. Also, Israel Corporation seems to be the type of social player who purposefully tends to 
destabilise  all  four  games  (  capital  market,  corporate  governance,  product  markets  and  social 
responsibility  )  and  seeking  opportunities  in  managing  high  uncertainty.   Royal  Dutch  Shell, 
belonging to the  R(i;t)  > R*(t) class,  slopes towards a  stable  financial  structure,  supporting an 
organisation clearly driven by managers rather than by block – holders, which tends to focus on its 
core businesses and even within this core businesses it is really selective as for projects to carry on 
the long run. The general goal seems to be maintaining dynamic equilibria in all four games. 
What does the model add to this case study what other theories would not lead to ? After all, what 
have been observed may be interpreted simply as multi – aspect economies of scale combined with 
a sensible assumption that firms listed in small stock markets would not develop such an important 
capital basis of equity as those listed in big stock markets. Well, the model adds specific causality.  
The bigger Royal Dutch Shell is not more profitable, ROA taken into account, simply because it is 
bigger and exploits economies of scale but because its position in the social game makes it follow a 
complex corporate strategy which aims at maximising ROA, minimising uncertainty, focus on core 
business and qualitative technological changes. The smaller Israel Corporation does not display a 
lower ROA because it can't exploit economies of scale, but because its overall social position in the 
oil & gas business makes it follow a strategy aimed at exploiting and actively creating situations of 
high  uncertainty,  as  well  as  diversify its  business  even if  it  is  at  the  expense  of  technological  
position in the core business.
Such interpretation  leads  to  a  more  general  conclusion  that  once  an  industry had  developed  a 
hierarchy of size among its participants, this hierarchy becomes an autonomous social force shaping 
future behaviour of the social players involved. The current position of a firm in the hierarchy of 
size in its core business is not simply a result and it does not simply allow to predict its future  
individual  results.  The  aforementioned  position  also  allows  to  predict  a  whole  set  of  future 
modalities of action endeavoured by the firm. The leaders of the sector are likely to behave as if 
they  have  had  reached  the  Coasean  optimal  size  of  organisation  (  Coase  1937),  whereas  the 
challengers seem to strive for reaching it. Furthermore a hypothesis arises that new industries are 
likely to grow through migration of capital from relatively small players operating in older, more 
established and structured sectors.  
The careful leader will notice that the case study does not mention actual facts about interactions of  
both firms with the broad social responsibility, thus about the SR game. This is because that aspect 
is to deduce out of observations about the other three games. Behaviour grouped under the general 
category  of  “social  responsibility”  is  one  of  the  hardest  to  predict  as  far  as  corporations  are 
concerned. The popular assumption is that corporation are socially responsible when it pays off. 
The question is how to predict whether the given corporation will judge the future probable pay-offs 
out of socially responsible actions high enough to undertake them. The model allows to deduce that 
if the given corporation strives to maintain dynamic equilibrium in three out of the four games, i.e. 
in capital market, corporate governance and product markets, then it is likely to strive for the same 
in the social responsibility game. Thus, it will try to find a balance between absorption and emission 
of  externalities.  Should  the  corporation  leverage  on  uncertainty  in  capital  markets,  corporate 
governance and product markets, it will probably search maximum emission of externalities and 
minimum  absorption  in  the  social  responsibility  game.  To  generalise,  large,  well  established 
corporations playing the leader's strategies in their respective core businesses are more likely to be 
socially responsible than aggressive challengers.
5. Quantitative study – the Warsaw Stock Exchange
As the model  introduced above comes to empirical applications, a question arises: if most players 
in a market tend to play their individual strategies out of Nash's dynamic equilibrium, are they not 
likely to shape, involuntarily,  another kind of dynamic equilibrium ? Generalising,  isn't a game 
likely  to  achieve  dynamic  equilibrium  even  if  most  players  purposefully  act  in  the  opposite 
direction, i.e. to exploit uncertainty, playing the strategies typical for aggressive challengers ? Are 
individual strategies, aiming at exploiting uncertainty resulting from the lack of clear causal rules of 
the game, paradoxically likely to shape the space of the game so as to create such predictable 
causalities  ?  Taking  these  questions  into  consideration,  the  following  hypothesis has  been 
formulated:  a  capital  market  can  reach  such  a  Nash's  dynamic  equilibrium,  in  which  capital 
accumulation is independent from operational efficiency of businesses. 
Emerging markets are a good place to observe the “aggressive challenger” type of corporation. 
Companies listed there are relatively young and are forced to face global rivals, whose both scale of 
activity  and  capital  resources  are  much  bigger.  The  still  relatively  small  but  quickly  growing 
Warsaw Stock Exchange in Poland is a good example. Companies listed in Warsaw seem to be 
bound to slope towards corporate strategies of the “aggressive challenger” type, thus favouring the 
exploitation of uncertainty rather  than its  minimisation and the struggle to maximise return on 
capital. Seventy - nine companies listed in had been observed, polled out from a total population of 
some 400 . The sample is composed of companies with different length of public listing history, 
ranging  from 15  to  84  months.  For  all  of  them the  time  series  of  trimestrial  observations  of  
operational profit ratio and the Tobin's q coefficient had been construed, since the first trimester of 
public listing until the 31st of December, 2008. Then the time series for each company were tested 
for correlation with the Pearson's correlation coefficient. Of course, Pearson's test assumes linearity 
of correlation, but as the goal of the test was to find interdependence between marginal values, 
linearity is what was searched. Curvilinear correlation was not really in the scope of interest. The 
detailed list of companies, with their correlation coefficients, is provided in the annex at the end of 
the present paper. 
As  a  result  of  the  test,  nine  firms  revealed  a  significantly  negative  correlation,  47  displayed 
insignificant  correlation  and  for  23  correlation  was  significantly  positive.  Some  63,5% of  the 
sample's book value of assets is concentrated in companies with negative or insignificant correlation 
between operational profit ratio and Tobin's q. Two paradigms of corporate strategies coexist in the 
emerging  Polish  public  capital  market.  One  is  oriented  at  accumulating  capital  whatever  the 
operational efficiency is and it effectively works, i.e. accumulation takes place indeed and investors 
do not seem to be bothered by the operational side of the businesses they invest in. In other words, 
the  capital  market  game  in  this  case  is  independent  from  the  product  market  game.  Mutual 
independence means that in each game the results R(i;t) aimed at in  are different. This, in turn, can 
take a twofold shape. Both games may be played without Nash's dynamic equilibria, thus in both 
games players aim at exploiting uncertainty rather than at maximising return on capital. However it 
is possible that just one of the games is played without dynamic equilibrium, the other one being 
played with it. That means strategies combining rational maximisation of operational efficiency in 
product markets with highly risky exploitation of uncertainty in financial markets, on one hand, or 
rational maximisation of return on capital in the capital market combined with the “hit and run” 
strategies  in  product  markets.   In  both  cases  the  capital  market,  for  those  firms,  is  a  highly 
inefficient one. The other pattern of corporate strategies, being a minority in the studied sample of 
firms works on the grounds of significant interdependence between those two games. Logically, 
such interdependence implies the simultaneous existence of dynamic equilibria in both games, with 
strategies played accordingly. For those firms, the capital market is close to perfect efficiency, as is 
serves to allocate financial resources according to operational efficiency of businesses. 
Is  any kind  of  dynamic  equilibrium arising  from these  results  ?  Is  there  any viable  causality 
underpinning the players' individual strategies ? Firstly it is to notice that even if the majority of 
players, owning the majority of assets, apparently play without dynamic equilibrium in the capital 
market and thus the aforementioned market is  highly inefficient in their  case,  a minority plays 
according to rules linked with dynamic equilibrium. There seem to be some market forces, both in 
the capital  market  and the product  markets games,  which push at  least  a certain percentage of 
corporate  strategies  into  the  framework  of  rational  maximisation,  instead  of  exploitation  of 
uncertainty.  Thus,  the  hypothesis  of   dynamic  equilibrium built  around  independence  between 
operational  efficiency  of  businesses  and  their  ability  to  accumulate  capital  has  been  partly 
confirmed. Whereas in the emerging Polish capital  market most players seem to play corporate 
strategies  of  the  “aggressive  challenger”  type  and the  market  seems to  accept  it,  some market 
players  choose a  different  path.  Therefore,  if  most  players  purposefully act  in  order  to  exploit 
uncertainty and not to achieve dynamic equilibrium in the game, they succeed in those goals but in 
the same time they make some other  players take on a completely different  pattern of balance 
between the capital market game and the product markets game, a pattern oriented on dynamic 
equilibrium. It  can be further  hypothesised that  in  any social  game those two types  of  players 
stimulate  each  other.  Seeing  that  most  players  accept  and actively create  dynamic  equilibrium 
incites some others to play “berserk”, breaking the well – known causal rules of the game. On the 
other hand, a general tendency to play strategies based on uncertainty motivates some players to 
play sounder and more in the long – term prospect. 
 
6. Conclusion
Both the theoretical model and the empirical evidence, introduced in the present paper allow to 
extend the analytical toolbox used for prediction of corporate strategies, defined in terms of real 
behaviour rather than forward – looking statements. The model, being an application of the games 
theory as well as of the institutional approach to economics, is grounded on one central assumption: 
corporations  are  structures  much  more  than  intentional  entities  and  these  structures  are  in 
interaction with still broader social structures. Therefore the essential causality of the model is the 
interaction  between  structure  and  behaviour.  The  model  can  support  both  qualitative  and 
quantitative  research.  The  two  sample  empirical  studies,  introduced  in  this  paper,  should  be 
considered as examples of a much wider range of applications. They bring, however, significant 
insights to the theory of the firm. Sectoral hierarchies of size and market power seem to be not only 
the result but also, and maybe in the first place, the motive force that creates the dichotomy between 
the strategy of “established giant” and that of “aggressive challenger”, disparities between them 
reaching to every aspect of corporate strategy, far beyond technological and marketing choices. The 
“aggressive challengers” focus on exploiting uncertainty rather than on maximising the return on 
capital, however, with time, through corporate diversification peculiar to their strategies they are 
likely  to  create  new  industries.  This  is  an  extension  of  the  monopolistic  competition  theory 
( Chamberlin 1933) as well as of the theory of industrial organisation ( Mason 1939; Bain 1951; 
1954; Porter 1980, 1981, 1985, 1991). Then, capital markets seem to naturally create mutual tension 
between  corporate  strategies  characterised  by  capital  accumulation  well  –  aligned   with 
technological development, visible in operational efficiency on one hand, and those featuring an 
accumulation of capital quite independent from technology. This, in turn means that whatever are 
the gains  offered by investment  in  technology,  there will  always be a substantial  set  of capital 
market players for whom efficient allocation is not the same at all that the most profitable one. That 
is a contribution to both the theory of capital markets and the theory of economic growth. 
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Appendix – list of companies studied at the Warsaw Stock 
Exchange and their correlation coefficients
Company
Pearson's 
correlation 
coefficient
Company Pearson's correlation coefficient Company
Pearson's 
correlation 
coefficient
ABG Spin 0,407099 Elzab 0,52887 PGF -0,202426
ABPL 0,241398 Energopol Południe -0,030474 PGNiG -0,208692
Agora 0,41308 Eurocash -0,255938 PKN Orlen 0,385591
Alchemia -0,28134 Grajewo 0,154512 Polimexms 0,044053
Alma -0,034757 Groclin 0,348338 Polnord 0,313031
Ambra -0,782218 GTC 0,334015 Prokom 0,03148
AMICA 0,313493 Hyperion -0,09598 Puławy Zakłady Azotowe 0,097012
Apator 0,049077 IB System 0,207174 Rafako -0,043507
Asseco Polska 0,211387 IGroup 0,35046 Ropczyce 0,07158
Atlanta Poland 0,137037 Indykpol -0,161373 Simple 0,236288
ATM 0,135592 Instal Lublin 0,406878 Spray 0,159243
ATM Grupa 0,011259 Intercars 0,761488 Swarzędz -0,131522
Bakalland -0,674609 Irena -0,116734 Sygnity 0,312791
BankierPL -0,231166 Kęty -0,169827 Świecie 0,764073
Betacom -0,288226 KGHM 0,687003 Talex -0,109348
Bioton 0,152023 Krosno -0,295089 Techmex -0,019491
Boryszew -0,57296 Kruk 0,489487 Teta -0,505672
Budimex -0,05699 Lotos 0,327251 TPSA 0,055389
Cersanit -0,095787 LZPS 0,23336 TVN 0,172209
Comarch 0,374265 Macrologic 0,377731 Vistula 0,358698
Comp -0,386417 Mediatel -0,186774 Wandalex 0,007536
Dębica 0,300083 Mieszko -0,43867 Wasko 0,35116
Echo Investment 0,09704 MNI 0,037128 Wawel 0,558553
Elektrobudowa 0,153675 Netia -0,129233 Yawal -0,359651
Novitus 0,447167 Orbis 0,208565 Żywiec 0,296376
One2One -0,181954 PBG -0,420156   
Optimus -0,132648 PCGuard -0,650153   
Detailed data about each of the companies studied is available from the author, upon request.
